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AbSTRACT
The exploration of public trust towards a democratic government has taken differ-
ent forms throughout history because it is a multi-dimensional and complicated 
process determined by actions, inactions, political, social and economic processes 
and societal power relationships. It is widely accepted that good governance, in 
turn, is a crucial element in the process of building citizens’ trust in government. 
This implies that unethical, corrupt actions negatively affect citizens’ trust, which 
is one of the reasons the relationship between social trust and governance has 
been a focal point of the academic and policy-making communities.
The present case studies are based on primary and secondary qualitative research 
and deal with concerns such as those in South Africa and Brazil and seek to explore 
the causal relationship between good governance and citizen trust and the effect of 
corrupt actions. Citizens’ trust takes different forms that fluctuate from the ‘general’ 
to the ‘particular/specific’ and such realities have different effects on governance as 
well as the shaping of public policy, attitudes and political imperatives. In both of 
the aforementioned countries issues of political, economic and social transforma-
tion and development are societal imperatives, empirical studies on such relations 
of trust and good governance can pave the way forward in re-evaluating the differ-
ences, similarities and forms of the struggle against corruption.
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AbbREvIATIONS
●● CGU (Comptroller General of Brazil)
●● DLTC (Driving Licence Testing Centre)
●● KZN (KwaZulu Natal)
●● PMDB (Brazilian Democratic Movement Party)
●● SSA (Statistics General South Africa)
●● WGI (World Governance Indicators)
INTRODUCTION
Trust in a government is determined by a multiplicity of political, economic and social 
factors and takes different forms. There is no doubt that the reality and/or percep-
tions of good and ethical governance of a State are one of the key ingredients shaping 
levels of trust or distrust. Actual or perceived public sector corruption erodes trust on 
both politicians and public officials despite the fact that obligations and duties of the 
elected political leaders are less specific and more conflictual in nature when com-
pared to those of civil servants. Citizens’ trust or distrust take a wide variety of forms 
that have direct or indirect effects on governance, shaping public policy, attitudes and 
political imperatives.
This article utilises a qualitative empirical framework to explore the causal relationship 
between good governance and citizen trust and the effect of corrupt actions in Brazil 
and South Africa.
ON GOOD GOvERNANCE AND TRUST
Amongst the most prevalent questions in the public domain in today’s global scene is 
‘when this thing (corruption) will end?’ It is certainly not a simple question to answer 
as the phenomenon has over the years become multi-layered, nation-wide based, 
complicated, and repetitive (Kaufmann et al. 2009; Woods & Mantzaris 2012).
Corruption is considered the most significant diversion and distortion of good gover-
nance that is basically a process through which a government exercises its power to 
manage a country ethically, through an honest and transparent utilisation of its hu-
man, natural and social resources for equitable, effective and efficient development 
for the entire population (Kane 2008:46–47; Kaufmann et al. 2009:4–5; Rotberg and 
Gisselquist 2009:10–11).
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It can be understood that such a generic conceptualisation can be supplemented 
with concrete examples that verify or negate ‘good governance’ such as account-
ability, transparency, political stability, peaceful co-existence, efficiency and effective-
ness at all layers of government, democratic representation, adherence to the rule 
of law, developmental objectives, and corruption control (Kurtz & Schrank 2007; 
Gisselquist 2012:18–19).
Good governance basically depends but not exclusively on the existence of ethical 
codes and accountability mechanisms that are structured and operationalised in such 
a way as to not only detect corruption decisively and effectively, but also as a pro-
cess and instrument of monitoring and evaluation (Nanda 2006:273–275; Landman 
& Larizza 2010:21–24). Such an evaluation will be planned and designed in a way as 
to assess the levels of service delivery as well as their strengths, weaknesses, gaps and 
possibilities for the future (Thomas 2010:32–33).
Given the historical circumstances of the transition period in both South Africa and 
Brazil, the foundation of the new good governance system ought to be based on eco-
nomic and social transformation at all levels and layers of government; modernisation 
of the public service that would hopefully lead to outstanding service quality, mainly 
independent from political pressures; high quality of policy formulation and quality of 
financial management as well as trust and confidence in the government’s commit-
ment to implement their policies morally ethically, transparently and free of corruption 
(World Governance Indicators 2013).
Both countries over the years, have built an assortment of organisational structures and 
processes aimed at strengthening accountability chains through legislation, rules and 
regulations. These are planned in such a way as to be able to identify weaknesses, gaps, 
and inconsistencies in the strict implementation of the legislative framework (Mantzaris 
& Pillay 2013:114; Peishakhin 2012:266–267; Peishakhin & Pinto 2010:130–132).
Within this context, it can be understood that the citizens of both countries expect 
good governance and the continuous promotion of a high standard of professional 
ethics in the public service where elected politicians and administrators will agree and 
work in unison in respect of governance monitoring, issues of effectiveness, efficiency 
and economy in service delivery and subsequent compliance evaluations professional 
ethics and detection, prevention, deterrence, monitoring, analysing, investigating, and 
responding to corruption (Woods & Mantzaris 2012).
Citizens ask questions relating to their lives and those of politicians and public ad-
ministrators because their well-being relies largely on the honesty, accountability and 
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legitimacy upon which administrative mechanisms operate within a democracy that is 
corrupt-free and healthy (Veenstra 2002:549–550).
Trust is always multi-layered, complicated, individual and collective, interpersonal 
and is manifested through perceptions, feelings, relationships, planning and action. It 
could be described as the illustration of all human contact and institutional interaction 
(Tonkiss et al. 2000).
When Warren (2006) wrote that the issue of trust surfaces each time a new policy 
is announced, he spoke about political trust which is based on knowledge or lack 
thereof, understanding, judgement that takes wide ranging forms, can be individually-
based (towards a President, provincial politician or administrator, or local government 
leader), collective (towards politicians in general, the judiciary or regional administra-
tors), or systemic (the entire political system).
On most occasions, the systemic overlaps with the personal trust or distrust of gov-
ernment because policy – non-direction or implementation of weaknesses tend to be 
personified by the Mayors, the President or the Minister of the State. This, because in 
many instances peoples’ evaluation of performance/s concentrates largely on a familiar 
face/s or the overall political system managed and led by the State and its apparatuses 
(‘the regime’) (Christensen & Laegreid 2003:3–4).
Citizen trust in state institutions or ruling or/and opposition parties is a serious baro-
meter of a healthy democracy because it epitomises the very essence of democratic 
legitimacy that is both internalised and externalised by peoples’ zest for wholehearted 
willingness to participate and act in the building of a democratic State that rewards 
honesty and punishes corruption.
Trust is not built only on the mere promulgation of progressive social and economic 
policies but above all their effective and efficient implementation (Thompson 2004). 
On the other hand, a society that is politically polarised and unstable with a political 
and administrative structure characterised by corruption, fragmented power and lack 
of consensus is prone to loss of trust that could lead to crisis because perpetual and 
uncontrollable corruption leads to social polarisation and instability (Ostrom & Walker 
2003). Political trust, in most instances, leads to increased political involvement on the 
part of citizens and subsequently higher electoral participation and activism (Chanley 
et al. 2000:240–241).
High levels of the lack of trust amongst citizens leads to loss of confidence and dis-
satisfaction in democracy. Extremely low levels of trust amongst citizens leads to long 
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periods of social, localised, provincial or national protest action, violence, destabilisa-
tion that can result in destructive consequences for governments and governance in 
general (Bovaird & Loeffler 2005:144–145; Catterberg & Moreno 2006:39–40).
These realities have been elaborated in considerable detail in a comprehensive man-
ner in the reflections of the relations of corruption, ethics and public trust in the South 
African context by Pillay (2017).
THE RESEARCH METHODS
This project is based on case studies rooted on contemporary events utilising both 
qualitative research methods such as direct observation, interviews and documentary 
primary and secondary analysis (Bryman & Bell 2007:25). It is based on the study 
of official national, provincial and municipal documents, municipal council meetings, 
and unstructured interviews with government officials, researchers and experts in 
Brazil who have first-hand information on these issues. The respondent’s anonymity 
and confidentiality was guaranteed.
THE CASE STUDIES
Hereunder is the presentation of some of the case studies in South Africa and Brazil.
SOUTH AFRICA
In South Africa, the case study revolves round a rural local municipality which is 
situated approximately 50 km north of Durban in the KwaZulu Natal Province, with a 
population of 140 000. Its land mass is basically owned by a tribal trust controlled by 
the King of the Zulu people.
It is inhibited by a population which primarily resides in traditional rural settlements 
and its agricultural land, predominantly sugarcane, accounts for at least a third of land 
mass of the municipal area. It has a town as a service centre. There is a well-structured 
industrial area in the middle of underdevelopment and poverty situated between the 
urban ports of Durban and Richards Bay and has an import and export facilities in-
frastructure. There is wide-spread poverty with a dependency rate of 60% and an 
unemployment rate of 28.6% of which 34.6% comprises the youth. About 40.4% of 
the population has no source of income while 24.3% earn less than R400 per month 
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and approximately, 64.7% of the population in the municipality live below the poverty 
line. Approximately 26% of the municipality’s households have access to piped water 
inside their dwelling, while the large numbers of patients are co-infected with other 
conditions, that is, a high correlation to Tuberculosis (TB) (Statistics South Africa 2011).
There is a cycle of corruption in the municipality. One of the most daring cases oc-
curred, when following the end of the five year contract of the municipality’s security 
private company (GTSC), a new service provider was awarded the contract (Enforce 
Security Company-ESC). There was no open tender in this instance as required by the 
relevant supply chain and procurement laws and regulations and the new company 
tariffs were four times higher compared to the previous one (R260 000 as opposed to 
R60 000 per month), and they did not possess the necessary resources to execute their 
mandate (Natal Hansard 2010).
The new security company belonged to the husband of the Provincial Minister of Local 
Government who also won a significant number of tenders throughout the province 
including the eThekwini Municipality (Durban) where all tender processes were vio-
lated for the award, as outlined in the Manase Report of 2012 (Dube 2012).
While corruption continued, the Minister employed a forensic investigation which rec-
ommended that the municipal manager be suspended and appear before a disciplin-
ary committee. A special council sitting ratified the key recommendations regarding 
the transgressions and corruption and suspended the municipal manager while other 
politicians and office bearers implicated in wrongdoing were not even reprimanded 
(Personal Interviews 1 and 2; Municipal Council Minutes February, 2011; KwaZulu 
Natal Hansard 2011).
The municipal manager awaited for over five months for a disciplinary hearing that did 
not take place. However, he was head-hunted and appointed as a municipal manager 
at a larger municipality in the Midlands in KwaZulu Natal, and within several months 
he was appointed as the Head of the newly established Municipal Academy under the 
auspices of the eThekwini Municipality (Personal Interview 3). He was replaced per-
manently by a former municipal manager from an Eastern Cape Province municipality, 
who was dismissed because he had handed-out illegal loans to administrative senior 
officials, councillors, including the chief financial officer (Personal Interviews 1 and 3).
One of the seminal cases of corruption through collusion occurred when hundreds of 
thousands of Rands was set aside for the Mayoral bodyguards’ firearms trainings. The 
money was utilised to purchase a Golf 6 GTI for the Mayor. The purchase was never 
debated and no resolution was not taken in a Council meeting (KZN Hansard 2013).
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The municipal manager increased the intern’s salaries (a number of whom were his or 
certain councillors’ relatives) without the authorisation of the relevant committees of 
the council. Family members were also appointed to divisions within the municipality 
without repercussions (Personal Interviews 1 and 2).
The control of the Supply Chain Management (SCM) and procurement systems by 
the Municipal Manager implied that the appointment of companies without following 
proper procedure became a norm, including firms of attorneys on a retention basis 
(Auditor-General 2014).
The well-publicised case in the municipality involved fraud involving the Chief Inspecting 
Officer of the Municipal Testing Station and 10 officials from the Driving License Testing 
Centre (DLTC). The syndicate comprising of approximately ten (10) to fifteen (15) munici-
pal staff members and driving schools sold fake divers’ licenses to thousands of citizens 
over a number of years. Those who got these licences did not even go to the test grounds 
and the Inspective Officer (mastermind) with seven officials (examiners) two administra-
tion clerks, and one driving school owner were arrested (KZN Hansard 2011, February). 
Their case, including the postponements continued for over three and a half years. The 
‘mastermind’ faced over 200 charges of racketeering, corruption and fraud under the 
Prevention of Organised Crime Act of 1998, but the State could not prove that the ac-
cused acted together. All the witnesses who worked at the municipality, including senior 
and middle managers who were aware of the situation for years, pleaded complete igno-
rance of the happenings. Furthermore, the municipality could only produce the rubber-
stamped ‘evidence’ from the driving centre. Other witnesses from the municipality did 
not testify at all while a number of them recanted elements of their statements (Personal 
Interviews 1, 2 and 3). All were acquitted.
Over the years while fraud and corruption continued unabated, thousands of the mu-
nicipality’s residents protested on a number of occasions calling for investigations into 
all allegations of fraud, corruption, lack of service delivery and nepotism by councillors 
and officials, primarily targeting the municipal manager and the mayor.
There have been a number of considerable but scattered ‘service delivery protests’ 
between 2011 and 2016 in the municipality. During these protests, the majority of 
the informal settlement residents generally comprising of approximately 1 000–1 500 
residents, threw stones at the police and passing cars and the reply was replete with 
rubber bullets, tear gas and water-canons. These were accompanied by many pub-
lic violence dockets. On several occasions, the protests turned more violent and the 
protesters burnt a number of state buildings including the local Social Development 
Department’s offices and other municipal infrastructure.
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In 2016, a very large section of the community in the municipality became active and 
destroyed and burnt vehicles, buildings and business premises demanding the removal 
of one name from the election list, that of the previous mayor (MetroTell 2016).
Businesses, a school and a clinic were held ransom and over 5 000 people went on a con-
tinuous rampage burning factories and vehicles in the protests. Police spread chemicals 
and fired rubber bullets before they arrested and charged 122 people for public violence, 
arson and malicious damage to property. Following continuous community mobilisation 
and further violence demanding their release, those held in a local prison were released 
after several days. The release followed the political intervention by the present mayor 
and a high powered delegation from the provincial ANC who met with the community at 
a gathering attended by over 5 000 people to be addressed by the politicians (Daily News 
2016). Within a week, eight factories and property were destroyed with damage running 
into millions of rands. These realities above all threatened the livelihood of over 25 000 
workers who rely on local industries for jobs. The businesses which were burnt down are 
still negotiating with their insurance companies because the future of 25 000 workers was 
at stake (Citizen 2016; Daily News 2016; eNCA 2016; Mercury 2016; MetroTell 2016).
Distrust can be very destructive.
The repercussions of distrust in South Africa
In the South African public opinion, the recently released political terrain opinion polls of 
existing levels of trust paints a bleak picture. The Afrobarometer survey that took place dur-
ing August-September 2015 (Afrobarometer 2016) revealed that there have been a number 
of events of a political, individual and economic nature that significantly affected trust neg-
ativity. Tough economic realities for the poor and substantial sections of the working and 
middle classes including the ‘Nkandla affair’ had very direct negative effects in respect of 
public trust. The continuous negative headlines on such issues magnify a series of corrupt 
activities that contributed significantly in a serious decrease in public and political trust.
In comparative terms popular trust in the President has dropped radically since 2011, 
standing at 34% (62% in 2011). This is the second-lowest level since the first research 
findings that appeared in 2000. The analysis also revealed that more than half of 
openly declared ANC voters indicated that they had no trust in the President of the 
country and the ruling party.
On the other hand, trust in provincial premiers, local government councils and of-
ficials Members of Parliament (MPs), provincial premiers, local government councils, 
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the ruling party, and opposition parties has also declined significantly, making political 
leaders the least-trusted public officials in the country. Trust in the President is lowest 
of all 18 institutions and leaders.
The survey revealed that among other state institutions, the courts of law, the police 
and the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) lost trust over the past four years, 
while trust in the South African Revenue Services (SARS), the Office of the Public 
Protector, and the National Prosecuting Authority remained stable. It was also revealed 
that the independent broadcast media enjoys significant high public trust climbing 
from 69% in 2011 to 79%.
According to the Afrobarometer (2016:3) survey stated that “increasing dissatisfaction 
with South Africa’s current leadership has spilled over into waning support for democra-
cy itself”. The lack of trust in political institutions and individuals holding political power 
such as the President has a direct negative effect on the voting patterns in the country. 
The empirical evidence relates the story concretely. Over the years, the Independent 
Electoral Commission (IEC) has introduced well-publicised voter registration drives 
which have had varying degrees of success. In comparative terms, the lack of trust can 
be perceived as one of the key reasons for large number of registered citizens not vot-
ing. In 1999, of the 18 million registered, 16.2 million voted. In 2009 the number of 
registered voters had increased to 23.1 million but only 17.9 million, voted. In the 2014 
elections, there were 25.3 million registered voters but only 18.4 million voted while 
in the 2016 municipal elections, 57.9% of those registered voted. This was higher than 
those who voted in 2011 (57.6%). The key issue that is not mentioned by the analysts is 
that comparatively, more than 1.5 million had registered as voters (IEC 2016:9).
Corruption appears to be an increasingly significant barrier to improved public service 
delivery (OECD 2013:6).
bRAZIL
In Brazil’s local municipalities, the most reported and recorded cases of corruption 
take place through the operations of ‘mediators’ that deal with politicians and/or 
administrators in the supply chain and procurement sections. There are cases of a 
Renault Traffic purchased as an ambulance priced at approximately $4 000–6 000 per 
purchase (Foreign Policy 2015:2–3). Such corruption is difficult to detect as it takes 
both a shallow as well as broad angle perception because initially it does not cause 
alarm. This implies that in many instances it is widespread and whistle-blowers are 
rare because they fear for their jobs and lives.
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Despite the belief that the Comptroller General of Brazil (CGU) has become efficient 
in inspecting municipal finances, one of the most important cases they managed to 
solve was the mediators’ involvement in a well-planned national syndicate ambulance 
peddling scheme. It was of notable success because it was a massive scheme (Power 
& Taylor 2011:23).
This was a somewhat mediating operation utilising supply chain management and 
procurement manipulation and political connectivity and the active participation by 
a number of companies that were exposed in the investigation for supplying high 
overpriced ambulances to a number of municipalities (Foreign Policy 2015:4–5). This 
corruption cycle had to be investigated by the federal police. Unfortunately, to date, 
there has been no outcome. This scheme took place in 19 of the 26 states in the coun-
try. The mediators and parliamentary staff colluded with ‘cooperative’ mayors who 
were instrumental in facilitating federal budget amendments that led the same group 
of companies winning all municipal tenders for ambulances at approximately 120 per 
cent above the market price (Zamboni & Litschig 2015:23).
The ‘connected’ conspirators in the system shared the circulated kickbacks. It was esti-
mated that over 300 mayors were directly involved in the act and were referred to in the 
media as the protagonists in the “Scandal of the Bloodsuckers”. When investigations were 
completed, Parliament ordered that proceedings against and impeachment of 69 federal 
deputies and three senators. However, this remains unresolved. Bearing in mind the exis-
tence of 5 570 municipal councils in the country and the levels of corruption one can just 
imagine the effects of ‘re-writing’ manipulated books, falsifying budget outcomes and con-
tinuous break-ins at municipal council establishments from which computers, laptops, cell 
phones and official documents are stolen and never recovered (Brollo et al. 2013:1760:1).
It has been confirmed that many corrupt mayors have avoided the might of the law 
over a number of years because of their affiliation to the governing party and central 
government treats them lightly. This is despite the fact that as punishment, their spend-
ing has been reduced by the federal governments.
There is also evidence showing of corrupt leaders who escape the law because they 
are considered ‘capable’ of delivering services to the people despite their illegal deeds 
and illegal transactions. It has been said that corruption is unpopular but politicians 
who are active and satisfy the needs of people are popular irrespective of their behav-
iour (Avis et al. 2017:22).
These are politicians who utilise what is left over from corruption in popular infrastruc-
tural or other popular needs. They are the adherents of rouba mas faz (“he steals but 
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he gets things done” (Ferraz & Finan 2008:705). Although the CGU utilised existing 
policy to fine or dismiss corrupt politicians or administrators, the looting continues 
(Poverty Action Lab 2011).
The repercussions of distrust in Brazil
Following the much debated “Lula moment” and the series of corrupt acts in the 
higher, middle and lower echelons of the Brazilian government, its popularity plum-
meted significantly. The majority of the country’s population blamed relentless cor-
ruption as the primary reason. By late 2015, 78% of the respondents of a countrywide 
public opinion survey did not trust the President and the government because they are 
involved in corruption while a mere 9% believed that the country’s economy would 
improve in the next 5 to 10 years (Alvez 2016:7). In the latest opinion polls, the citi-
zens scathed the former President Rousseff, the newly appointed President including 
Temer and Lula da Silva, who was previously considered the most revered leader.
A Gallup poll in April 2016 revealed that only 26% of the respondents believed that 
Brazil politicians will become more honest while 53% felt that nothing would change 
in the country. Only 23% said that the country’s Congress cares or acts in the inter-
ests of the people. When asked if they thought Congress was acting on behalf of the 
public’s interest during the ongoing impeachment process, only 23% replied in the af-
firmative while 63% said no. Fifty eight per cent (58%) of those involved in the survey 
supported Roussef’s impeachment that followed an alleged illegal act that broke the 
budget laws under Article 85 of the Brazilian Constitution. Overall, there was a general 
agreement amongst both camps that nothing would change for the better in Brazil. 
In the 2016 municipal elections, despite the fact that all the Brazilians are obliged by 
law to vote, the abstention rate stood at 17.5% in nationwide polls, 2% less than in 
2014. Bearing in mind that abstention is penalised by a fine unless the voters submit 
satisfactory reasons for abstaining. The refusal to vote and the high number of blank 
and spoiled ballots highlighted a high level of disillusionment by the people of their 
politicians (Xinhua 2016:2).
It was a serious degree of disenchantment with the governing elites that pinpointed an 
unprecedented lack of trust and the need for political change. One can understand 
such sentiments when over 50 politicians in the country have been under investigation 
for a number of corrupt acts that seriously diminished the peoples’ confidence towards 
the country’s political establishment (Ribeiro 2016:8).
Following the massive corruption in the state-run oil company, Petrobras, includ-
ing a number of smaller ones, the Workers’ Party was defeated in a number of key 
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constituencies which included mayors and local council members across Brazil. 
However, what was more pertinent for the political future was the abstention, for ex-
ample, in Sao Paulo, 21.8% did not vote, 11.5% of the votes were spoiled while 5.3% 
were left blank. Moreover, a top businessman, Joao Doria, was victorious in the largest 
city, Sao Paulo because his election manifesto expressed the lack of trust for politicians 
and belief in a business-orientated, non-political governance (Alvez 2016:7).
In the second largest city, Rio de Janeiro, Temer’s PMDB (the Brazilian Democratic 
Movement Party) was defeated, 24.3% of the population abstained, 12.7% spoilt their 
votes and 5% left theirs blank (Plus 55 2016).
CONCLUSION
The case studies are instrumental in understanding how corruption erodes public trust 
in municipalities and extends to the national level. Corrupt acts bear important reper-
cussions for politicians and administrations and despite the differences in committing 
them, the results and the popular response are in the final analysis similar in shaping 
beliefs and attitudes. The key difference lies in the forms that these sentiments take in 
respect of communities’ actions. In South Africa, the lack of public and political trust 
sometimes take on a violent character even in rural or peri-urban areas, but in Brazil 
the most vociferous protests is concentrated primarily in urban areas such as Sao Paulo 
or Rio De Janeiro.
The key question that arises remains: How can trust be regained when laws, rules and 
regulations are disregarded by the mayor’s offices?
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